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Facing the low quality of accounting information, government and law cannot 
shoulder the important task alone while market and the society have already 
spontaneously evolved many alternative governance institutions. They can exit 
without the regulation of law and enforcement by government and are called private 
order. This paper applies the research about private order in economics to accounting 
research, using game theory and approach of history research to study the function, 
property and changes of private order in accounting information governance. As to a 
developing country like China in its economic transition, it is expected that this 
research may help people understand private orders in the field of market order like 
accounting information governance, promote the construction and development of 
relevant private orders and give an impulse to the regression of government, market 
and social function respectively. 
This paper first establishes a basic concept framework, which is based on Aoki’s 
(2001) definition of institution for the analysis of the institution concept of accounting 
information governance and the explanation of the concept, shape, classification and 
function of private order of accounting information governance. 
Then, this paper gives a deep analysis of the four private orders. 
The author makes a research on the private order of relation-based governance 
and maintains that the private order of relation-based governance plays a role in 
governance when legal norm and formal contract have not come into effect. He also 
attempts to analyze how relation-based governance transits to rule-based governance: 
the enlargement of enterprise scale will promote this transition, but in relational 
society, this kind of transition lacks motive force, it needs the government to play a 
greater role. 
The author regards civil audit as a game equilibrium which includes many 
market participants, and analyzes the factors which can realize the equilibrium. After 
using the change history of American civil audit to explain the above-mentioned 
conclusion, we can see how the civil audit changes from the early complete private 
order to the mode in which the private order and public institution collaborate now.  
In the present institution centered on the rule-based governance commonly exists 
a kind of relation-based private order, which can influence investors in their appraisal 
of managers’ reputation through multiple and unofficial information channels, and 















formal contract. It is called reputation order in this paper. The research is concentrated 
on a sub-field of accounting information governance ——earning management. The 
author studies on the function of reputation order in the governance of earning 
management as well as the relation among earning management, moral preference and 
accounting reputation. 
 The accounting ethics order is regarded as the indispensable settlement for 
accounting information governance. This paper discusses how it is formed. First of all, 
there should be a good professional ethics education system and public opinion 
atmosphere, which will help train cooperative managers. Then, non-cooperative 
managers have to realize the benefit of cooperation. In this way, they will cooperate 
with cooperative managers. The knowledge of history and culture, mandatory system 
and their own experience of institutional changes can help the managers realize the 
benefit of cooperation. 
Finally, this paper draws the general conclusion from the above specific ones. 
From the general frame of private order, the author summarizes the research angle, 
function, property, changes of the private order in accounting information governance 
and the relation between private order and public institution. 
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Zimmerman(1983)以及 Previts and Merino(1998)都提供了大量的史料证据表明
现代民间审计在法律强制安排之前就已经被大多数企业认为是理所当然的事。刘


















































                                                                 
① 转引自：Dixit（2004，中译本 2007，p.5）。原文：Rodrik,ed.2003.In search of prosperity: analytical 
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